Military Alliance on the Sudan-Ethiopia Border

Report by: Brown Land

Historical Context of the Alliance
The Emergence of the Military Pact (February 2024)
In February 2024, the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”), announced a surprise strategic alliance with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), led by Joseph Toka. This pact emerged ten months into the Sudanese civil war, which erupted on April 15, 2023, between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF.
This alliance secured three critical assets for the RSF:

• Combat Experience: Access to seasoned fighters from the SPLM-N.
• Strategic Terrain: A foothold in the Blue Nile State.
• Border Access: A direct corridor to the Ethiopian border via the Yabus region.
  The Ethiopian Pillars of Support
  Historical Ties to the SPLM-N:
  Ethiopia has a long-standing history of supporting the SPLM-N dating back to the 1980s and 90s. Successive Ethiopian administrations allowed the movement to operate from their territory, providing material and logistical aid. This legacy facilitated the current cooperation with Joseph Toka’s faction.
  Current Ethiopian Motivations:

1. The GERD Factor: With the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) operational and water management tensions rising, Addis Ababa seeks to weaken the Egyptian-backed Sudanese Army.
2. Border Disputes: Tensions spiked after the SAF reclaimed 90% of the disputed Al-Fashaga borderlands in late 2020, capitalising on Ethiopia’s preoccupation with the Tigray War.
3. Regional Rivalries: Relations soured further when the SAF began collaborating with the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF), a primary adversary of the Ethiopian government.
   The Pivotal Role of the UAE
   Financing and Arming the RSF:
   Since the conflict’s onset in April 2023, the UN and US have documented extensive Emirati support for the RSF:

• Congressional Allegations: US Senator Chris Van Hollen confirmed that the UAE is supplying the RSF with weaponry, directly contradicting its assurances to Washington.
• Intelligence Findings: US intelligence reports highlight an influx of Emirati-supplied arms, including Chinese-made drones, heavy machine guns, and mortars.
• Logistical Bridge: At least 86 cargo flights from the UAE to Chad have been identified as arms deliveries.
• Financial Networks: The US has sanctioned six UAE-based companies involved in laundering Sudanese gold proceeds to fund RSF arms procurement.
  Evolution of the Ethiopian Role (2025–2026)
  From Covert Support to Direct Involvement:
  Phase I: October–November 2025
• Establishment of a secret training camp in the Mengi area of Benishangul-Gumuz, with a capacity for 10,000 recruits.
• Arrival of dozens of Land Cruisers, trucks, RSF units, and Emirati military instructors.
• The expansion of Asosa Airport (since August 2025) into a primary hub for drone operations.
  Phase II: December 2025–January 2026
• By early January 2026, 4,300 RSF fighters were undergoing active military training at the camp.
• Intensified military movements across the Sudan-Ethiopia border.
• Construction of new satellite camps in Ondulu and Gashan (per exclusive Brown Land intelligence).
  Phase III: February 2026
• On February 3, 2026, joint RSF-SPLM-N forces launched an offensive on three sites in the Blue Nile, capturing the town of Deim Mansour.
• Drones launched from UAE-supervised bases in Benishangul-Gumuz targeted Damazin and Kurmuk.
  Joseph Toka: The Key Field Commander
  Joseph Toka, a high-ranking commander affiliated with the SPLM-N (Al-Hilu faction), operates from the Yabus region on Sudan’s southeastern border. Following the 2017 split within the SPLM-N, Toka joined the Al-Hilu camp and began active combat alongside the RSF in March 2025. On February 27, 2025, Toka received direct Ethiopian logistical support in Yabus town, significantly bolstering his regional military capabilities.
  Yabus: A New Military Logistics Hub
  During the second year of the alliance (February 2025 – February 2026), Yabus underwent a radical transformation:

1. Strategic Corridor: The quiet border village evolved into an active military artery for the transit of arms and personnel.
2. Drone Launchpad: Yabus, along with the Balila and Makaf areas, became primary launch sites for drones targeting Damazin and Kurmuk.
3. Integrated Network: A system of interconnected camps (Mengi, Ondulu, Gashan) now operates seamlessly across the border.
   The Strategic Supply Route
   The primary logistical axis follows this path:
   Asosa (Ethiopia) → Aburamo → Sherkole Ahofundo → Gashan (Ethiopia) → Yabus (Sudan) → Balila, Makaf, Sanda.
   Strategic Significance:

• Proximity to GERD: Located only 63 km from the dam.
• Tri-Border Junction: Sits at the intersection of Sudan, Ethiopia, and South Sudan.
• Tactical Shield: The route is difficult to monitor and remains largely resilient to traditional airstrikes.
  Recent Escalation (February 2026)
  In recent days, military activity has surged:
• Over 100 Land Cruisers entered Yabus from Asosa within weeks.
• Four direct flights from Ethiopia delivered weapon consignments and drones.
• Continuous movement of Ethiopian military “Ural” trucks transporting ammunition.
• Warnings of an imminent assault on Kurmuk as 1,500 displaced persons arrive in the city.
  Conclusion
  The Shift to Proxy War
  What began as an internal Sudanese conflict has morphed into a regional proxy war:
• UAE: Funding and arming the RSF.
• Ethiopia: Providing territory, training, and logistics.
• Egypt: Supporting the Sudanese Army (SAF).
• Russia & Iran: Supplying weaponry to both sides of the conflict.
  Risk of Regional Contagion
  The Sudan-Ethiopia border zone has become a volatile flashpoint. Experts warn that the establishment of RSF training facilities inside Ethiopia represents a dangerous escalation that could trigger a bloodier phase in the Horn of Africa, potentially threatening the security of the GERD and drawing South Sudan into the fray.