Saving the Militia or Ending the War?
Truth Lens | Ibrahim Shaglawi
In politics, as in wars, not every peace initiative is innocent, and not every call for settlement is free from calculations of power. What is unfolding in the Sudanese file clearly reveals that the battle of pressure has become no less fierce than the battle of the field, and that the real question is no longer: how does the war stop, but at what cost, and for whose benefit?
The repeated statements issued by the U.S. envoy Musaad Boulos across several platforms, in which he spoke about understandings or “preliminary approvals” from the two sides of the conflict on humanitarian and political arrangements, reflect a clear American insistence on pushing a well-defined settlement track. In an interview with the Financial Times in September 2025, Boulos said that the mechanism for delivering aid to Darfur had become “very close” following coordination with the Rapid Support Forces within what became known as the Quartet “the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE.”
This specific point reveals the core of the dilemma; Washington appears keen to keep the militia within the settlement equation—not as a defeated party to be reintegrated under state conditions, but as an actor that should be politically salvaged to secure negotiating balance. Here, peace turns into a tool for conflict management rather than a decisive path to ending it.
However, the official Sudanese reading of this track came entirely different. At the graduation of officers of Karari University yesterday, the response of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan was decisive and loaded with multiple messages. Al-Burhan did not merely affirm the continuation of the “Battle of Dignity” until the rebellion is eliminated or surrenders; he presented a clear equation: the door is open to misled individuals, but closed to the survival of the rebellion as an independent entity.
This formulation reflects the military leadership’s adherence to the logic of field decisiveness first, then settlement on the state’s terms later—something that objectively conflicts with any international approach seeking to establish a balance between the army and the militia.
Al-Burhan’s speech also carried a strategic dimension that goes beyond the present moment, especially his talk about building a “smart army” based on technology and information. This signals that the military establishment is thinking about the post-war phase as a war different in its nature and tools. From a political analysis perspective, this orientation reinforces the hypothesis that the military leadership views the conflict as a long-term existential one, not a crisis that can be quickly closed through fragile or unreliable transitional arrangements.
As for the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ statement in response to Musaad Boulos’ remarks, it came in firm and calculated diplomatic language while also carrying a strict position. The ministry was keen to establish three messages: first, that presenting proposals does not mean accepting them; second, that the criterion for evaluation is the supreme national interest; and third, the rejection of any formula that could be understood as interference in internal affairs. This wording reflects a careful balancing attempt between not closing the door to productive international efforts and not allowing coercive tracks that exceed sovereignty and national will.
The convergence between the military leadership’s speech and the Foreign Ministry’s statement reflects the construction of a unified official position grounded in a popular mood influenced by the scale of violations committed by the Rapid Support Forces during the war. International reports have documented serious abuses against civilians, including allegations that may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, which have left a deep social wound, particularly in Darfur, Kordofan, and Al-Jazira. This factor makes any talk of reintegrating the militia into political or security life a sensitive and internally rejected matter.
When these positions are assembled into one tableau, it becomes clear that the scene is heading toward a widening gap between the American approach and the official Sudanese stance.
Washington is moving with the logic of conflict management and stabilizing its balances in preparation for a political settlement, while the leadership in Khartoum is moving with the logic of ending the rebellion militarily before any political process leading to peace. This gap is the crux of the matter at the current stage, and it will determine whether the American initiative will turn into an actual negotiating track to save the militia or to end the war, or remain merely limited political pressure.
More importantly, the indirect international insistence on keeping the militia within the solution equation carries strategic risks, as it may be interpreted internally as an attempt to recycle the crisis rather than resolve it. In a highly sensitive conflict environment such as Sudan, any settlement that does not stem from the state’s legitimate monopoly over arms will remain vulnerable to collapse, no matter how strong external guarantees may be.
In sum, according to #Truth_Lens, the coming phase appears open to three scenarios: either field advances that strengthen Khartoum’s position and impose its negotiating terms, or increasing international pressure to impose a weakly guaranteed ceasefire, or a prolonged push and pull that keeps the war in the gray zone. Between these paths, the decisive factor remains the Sudanese state’s ability to unify its internal front, because battles of sovereignty are ultimately not settled in statements alone, but in the balance of will between the inside and the outside.
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