Ten useful points to understand the current situation in Sudan; part (1)

Mekki ElMograbi

1\ The last episode from the 63-year-old series!

The time of the «vicious cycle» of the military and civilians in Sudan extended after the independence in 1956 for more than sixty years.

Therefore, this era is considered as a complete social cycle and the naked truth is that it has ended. Inside the bigger cycle, there were sub-cycles, for example; Numairi regime – 1969, witnessed the same struggle within itself between the Communist Party and the military. Ingaz regime – 1989, of the Islamic Movement, witnessed the same conflict in different forms.

The Sudanese national era has ended, then a new era had begun.

According to the theory of the social cycle of history, there should be no surprise to describe the new era as not national or with incomplete independence. What happened in Sudan on April 11th 2019 was not a beginning of a transitional period towards democracy within the same era, it was the end to the entire national era (1956 to 2019) in which Al-

Bashir›s final years were the last chapter; the phase of vanishing. The warning signs of the end of the national era began with the imposition of foreign hegemony on Sudan under the cover of the UN mandate over parts of the country, then with the signing of the Naivasha Agreement in 2005 under the threat of the Sudan Peace Act of US Congress.

Then, the South seceded in 2011, as evidence of the failure of the national era to maintain the unity

of Sudan.

In this context, and over ten years of the fragility of the national state in Sudan, many groups who were organizing the popular movement had succeeded in establishing civil society networks and parallel trade

Unions They however, belong to ideas and concepts that the national era did not succeed in representing them.

As a result, their external linkages became independent from the opposition and the national parties that their members entered into a state of dual affiliation; national and not national.

This explains the phenomenon of activists who were dismissed and defected from their parties, as it was very easy for countries and organizations to coordinate all these groups and elements to create a «civil vanguard» that was able to lead the revolution and gain full satisfaction of the new fresh generation.

After reaching power, another form of conflict began between parties and activists, as the hybrid civilian government and the parties were not in agreement.

As a result, the donors slowed down their support to the transition in order to tame and discipline political parties.

2\ Very similar to the Consultative Council for Northern Sudan 1944 The current regime came to power in an era that is not national, rather, it is similar to the stage of hybridization of colonial rule with the national contribution which created (the Consultative Council for Northern Sudan) in 1944.

The best expectation is the stage of the (Legislative Assembly) in the year 1948, in which the leader of independence Ismael AL-AZHARI said, “We reject it even if it is cleared from any defect”. Strangely, there is a strong resemblance between the council and the transitional parliament that was promised under the constitutional document in 2019.

3\ The chance for this new regime to keep the power is big, despite its weakness: Mainly because this regime fits the new era and its “game rules”. Despite its weakness and incompatibility between its components, it has a chance to survive. It is clear that the international sponsors for the transition in Sudan realize that the government might fall due to poor economic and executive performance.

Still, they do not want to improve the conditions or to let it fall, they will not «pull the plug», they know that Sudanese people will do it. In fact, they want to exploit the government’s weakness until the bitter end. The reason is to make sure that any regime that succeeds the current one will be bound by “steel chains” of international agreements, national laws, military, international, and foreign outposts.

They want to make it difficult for the newcomers – most likely «the center-right alliance» – to change anything, if they dare to try, they will bring Sudan again closer to the “sanctions arsenal”. Moreover, there is a contradiction. Some people who reject this government want to re-produce a national military government with a civilian facade. Others reject this move and want democratic elections. That means there are no shared goals among the Sudanese political arena.

4\ Foxfight:

Italian sociologist Vilfredo PARETO, one of the proponents of the theory of the social cycle of history, argues that power is constantly shifting from «cunning foxes» to «violent lions» and vice versa. According to the reality that after the national era there will be an era which is subject to foreign influence, in the case of Sudan, the national era was concluded with a strong and violent regime, therefore whoever comes after that, the advantage is not the violence. What is happening now is a combination of external and internal deception, and a hidden conflict even between the components of the new regime.

The era of lions is over.

Mekki ElMograbi is a press writer on African affairs. He can be reached through his email (elmograbi@gmail.com) or his contact number +249912139350 (Whatsapp and Telegram)

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