Press Writer on African Affairs
Hamdok’s Initiative is a good start, however, it should include Islamists. Otherwise, the situation is ready for a second revolutionary wave.
I wrote before an article titled “Three Possible Scenarios for Sudan to Avoid War and Division” but now it seems that we have only one scenario for Sudan to avoid total collapse.
Hamdok’s Initiative as a start for the solution could be the safest way, however, it should be widened and include Islamists within the reconciliation. Otherwise, the situation will push them to the Sudanese streets, which is bad for the government because the streets are ready for a second revolutionary wave.
Hamdok already has started his talks with leaders of armed movements from the East and Darfur who are holding in their hands agreements that are fully recognized by AU and the international community. The alliance of freedom and change denied their very right to participate in the transition but Hamdok decided to handle the issue and to hold talks with them according to the constitutional document. Hopefully, the initiative will be widened after that to include all Sudanese.
The cornerstone of the Initiative is Hamdok himself not what so-called freedom and change alliance because they abandoned the document that they made. In contrast, Hamdok’s popularity is getting down and the economic crisis is hitting the Sudanese people despite the strong and brave reforms made by his government.
It is not fair to accuse Hamdok of the failure while the biggest part of the economic crisis is administrative and not at the federal level of Hamdok’s cabinet but within the state and local levels where the government is run by fresh activists and politicians who have no experience. The propaganda and the claims of the deep state that impeding governmental performance are fading out now. People see these claims after two years as false and weak excuses. For example, the lies about “some Islamists” who turned off the valves of water pipes inside the cities and the local communities became nothing but a silly joke.
The dismantling committee has fired more than 200 employees and technicians, then people waited for the flow of the water with no happy results. “why not they asked them to turn on the valves before the decision”, one of the former supporters and fans of the committee said, “it was just a big lie because if a person turned off valves, he should be sent to the court, not to his home” he said!
Let us discuss the only possible scenario. I have said before the three scenarios are “Egyptian Military Scenario, Iraqi Democratic quotas system, or African democracy, the nearest example is Kenya.”
I think a hybrid “Egyptian- Iraqi scenario” could be better than having one of them.
The first scenario, the Egyptian model; the military takes over the political arena not to rule but to lead the country to well-prepared elections.
The second scenario, the Iraqi settlement or the sectarian quota system “to be modified in Sudan to ethnic and political quotas system.”
Although most of the comments on my previous article suggest that the Iraqi scenario is nearer to the situation of Sudan, there is a big difference between Iraq after the collapse of Saddam’s regime and Sudan after ousting Bashir. In Iraq, the foreign armies and US military secured the scenario. In Sudan, only the Sudanese army can secure the ethnic and political quota system because Sudan is not under occupation.
The Sudanese army will not secure the scenario and then be criminalized after the stability, they need guarantees. The only guarantee is the share in the power and scenario from A to Z.
Here is the question; how can the military share in a civilian rule in a democratic change while most of the documents and even the law that passed by US congress gave them this right only during the transitional period? Do you think the international community will be tolerant with more than a five-year transitional period? Sudanese people and the new generation will reject the idea!
The answer is: having Islamists and former NCP “in a new shape” as a political extension for the military component can secure the deal from anti-military hardliners. Even ICC is indeed able to delay the procedures against the military side during the transitional period because the Rome charter of the ICC gave the prosecution this right but still, it will be an unfinished deal unless all Sudanese including Islamists approve the great compromise.
In short, Sudan needs to strengthen the transition not to extend the transition, Sudan needs to complete and cut the available deal not to make new deals.