Omer B. Abu Haraz
In the last time articles, a conclusive was reached that the present three partners of the revolutions, the military, civilians, and the armed struggle signatories of the Juba Peace Agreement of October 2020 will be equally held responsible and accountable by a likely event of a different military coup.
Likely because all elements of a radical change are in the make. Resentment of the majority of people on the sky-rocketing prices of commodities, deterioration of services, especially power, water, health care, medicine, and education together with a growing incident of poverty crimes manifested in the streets, looting, killing, house burglars, shoplifting and breaking by organized groups of displaced youngsters from inside Sudan and refugees from the Southern/Eastern and West borders. These precarious situations are shrouded by widening rifts between the three partners. Rifts that rekindled the ugly tribal rhetoric, tribal deadly confrontations in the west, and tribal nascent insurrection in the East led to many deadly confrontations between tribes especially in Port Sudan, and to barricading and closing of the lifeline highway from Post Sudan to Khartoum.
All three partners are and will be equally responsible for the creation of an atmosphere very conducive to the intervention of some elements of the middle and low ranks of the army when the swelling popular resentment inches the pressure point of millions taking to streets accompanied by violence, vandalism, looting to the near-anarchy situation.
The civilian component Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) are in disarray. Some are still adamant in protecting the slogans of the revolution, others siding the military partner. The armed struggle factions are aligned with the military.
The civilian government failed to bridge the gaps of making ends meet in the earning and expenditure of the majority of the people. After the courageous and correct decisions to lift subsidies, floating currency value, and unifying customs rate prices went up as expected but the government’s shaggiest steps to reach the poor by the donated fund of US$800 million aggravated the situation.
The armed struggle factions did very little to address the growing tribal confrontations in Darfur and Kordofan.
The third partner, the military component seems to be enjoying the calculated media attack and hostile writings against the civilian government and its head Dr. Hamdok forgetting that the most dreadful element leading to a drastic and sudden change in the security and peace in the country.
Although security and peace in their entire and only function they are not doing enough to observe and keep it. The lives of law-abiding citizens in the capital are continuously threatened by organized clandestinely supported by opponents of the revolution. The falling of the transitional government will not absolve the military partner of its only duty to make peace and security prevailing in the country They will be held accountable to any form of change.
The only way out under the complex and fluid situation is an agreed-upon white coupon the bases of:
- New pragmatic constitutional documents to be drafted, ratified, and signed by all three partners to replace the present document.
- PCD to separate unequivocally the civilian and military partners into two sovereign councils. The High Military Council for protection of democracy (HMCPD) which members are the present 5 members of the hybrid security council (HMCPD to be accommodated in the Army HQ. Role of the HMCPD to observe, monitor, and intervene when there is a real threat to democratic change. HMCPS is to be a sustained body on the governance of Sudan even after the elapse of the transitional period and elections.
- Civilian Sovereign Council (CSC) of a president (preferably Dr. Hamdok and two representing the FFC, 1 the head of the Revolutionary Movement and the fourth to be vacant to be filled by the remaining two military factions of SPLM-N (Kordofan) and SLM of Abdulwahid. Duties of the CSC restricted to sovereignty tasks only far from any executive role.
- Formation of the council of ministers headed by a national politician not affiliated to any political party in the present arena. Ministers likewise to politicians, not technocrats and non-partisan also.
- Immediate formation of the legislative council to resolve the controversial issues of normalization of relation with Israel, joining ICC, completion of a judicial body, endorsing or changing the nominated ministers and cabinet members, supervising the performance of the individual ministers and the whole cabinet and the right to cast a vote of no confidence in the government, approving international agreements and approving the economic and political policies especially in foreign affairs and the choice of leaning to which regional or international axis.
- Without this separation in duties and roles o the military and civilian components, Sudan cannot move forward to a sustained democratic change.