opinion

Was there a hidden deal between Burhan and Hamdok? If Yes, what then?

By Mekki ELMOGRABI
Press Writer on African Affairs
WhatsApp & Telegram +249912139350
elmograbi@gmail.com

A considerable number of my esteemed readers said to me that I repeatedly sent signals in my previous articles that what happened on 25 October 2021 was already agreed upon between Burhan and Hamdok.

I did not say this, or rather I did not predict it in this way at all, but let us discuss this hypothesis to anticipate what will happen shortly.

Regarding the validity of this hypothesis, there were limited disputes between Burhan and Hamdok on the way of the decision-making process and its layout but not on the decision itself. It was logical for me that Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok would prefer to take the decision and bear the political, legal, and constitutional responsibility. However, he has chosen another way.

As a result, the responsibility has been divided with a high degree of professionalism; Hamdok and some civilians bear the political responsibility, while Burhan and the military component bear legal and constitutional responsibility, here was the deal!

Hamdok can dismantle the political responsibility through internal piecemeal deals and agreements with the leaders of some political parties and individuals but not by dealing with them as one bloc. At this point, no difference between FFC – Central Council, FFC – National Charter, or the newcomers.

It is very clear that he started to do that. He launched his efforts by meeting with some of the resistance committees and with his blessings, the Minister of Federal Government, Buthaina Dinar from (FFC – Central Council) has restored the committees to work, and no one knows what is going on between Hamdok and the political forces, former ministers and advisors but the phenomenon of individual resignations at different timings, while some assistants and advisors are still sticking to their position or hiding with no comments tells us that something is going on between Hamdok and the civilians. Other indicators confirm that all parties and individuals – even if they declared collective and total rejection – are negotiating separately.

The military component, from its side, can dismantle the external part of legal and constitutional responsibility through deals and agreements. Big players and regional countries have the willingness for these deals more than supporting democracy in Sudan. Some of them are not even welcoming any democratic transformation at all.

Despite the declared positions and even other decisions possibly to be announced against the military component in Sudan, it is clear that there are ongoing talks on many issues. none of the international partners calls for ending the civilian-military partnership or threatening the new regime that is starting to take shape, but rather they are supporting it and contributing to its formation.

If this hypothesis is correct, Hamdok and the civilian supporters of the deal will provide the military component with assistance to dismantle the legal and constitutional responsibility, and in return, the military component and its international allies will provide the civilian component with assistance to dismantle the political responsibility.

Is it possible to spoil the new deal? Is it useful to incite Hamdok or the military component to renege on its commitments with the other?

The answer is NO!

I do not think that there is a minimum level of trust among the components that reject the Burhan-Hamdok agreement or rather who are declaring this position while they are negotiating how to join the club.

Still, we need to discuss the issue of street protests and the rejectionist youth. In my view, this factor cannot be underestimated, but it should not be overstated either.

This factor had a great influence during the revolutionary change from December 2018 to April 2019, at that time there was a partisan-popular-international consensus or at least semi-consensus. The public opinion against the former regime was so negative, the Sudanese youth did not achieve all victories alone.

Although some observers believe that the new generation is stubborn and does not possess the necessary political wisdom to assess the situation and understand these developments, I am confident that a strong debate will erupt among the groups of the protesters and the youth. Most of them are completely independent of the parties and forces who are trying to manipulate them.

The protests will continue, but the expectations will be lowered.

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