Complexing Developments

Omer Abou-Haraz

A professor of physics wrote in the introduction of a chapter in his book about Ideal Gas: “Further approach to an ideal behavior becomes more difficult the nearer we come to it.”
This exactly what is happening in the current dilemma of the political situation in Sudan.
Last week was full of optimism that a near settlement will be ratified by the military component and the original incubator of the revolution (The Forces of Freedom and Change -FFC-1). A settlement based on a Constitution draft to govern a 2-year transitional period prepared by the Sudanese Bar Association – advocates provisional committee -.
In an unexpected statement, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) announced that Mawlana Mohamed Osma El-Mirghani will return to Sudan on November 21st after being in exile for ten years between UK and Egypt.
He was received at Khartoum Airport by well-prepared massive presence of thousands of supporters and official military, police and security groups. Mawlana El-Mirghani (86 years) looked ailing and exhausted. His som El-Hassan was escorted by security troops away from reaching and receiving his father. Unfortunate body and hand battling between his bodyguards and the security troops led El-Hassan to stop and abandon his efforts to reach his father. Perpetrations of the calculated forbidding of El-Hassan to reach his father alleged that Mawlana asked for expelling his son from the airport premises otherwise he will not disembark. Many people doubted this allegations.
The immediate aftermath of the arrival of Mawlana cast a big shadow of doubt about the main reason behind the return of Mawlana.
What happened after less than 24 hours from his arrival a declation of a new political body was announced called FFC-2, the Democratic Bloc. Gaafar El-Mirghani, the Deputy President of DUP was selected Chairman of the new FFC-2 with Dr. Jibril Ibrahim Deputy, Minnawi head of Political Secretary and others. The new FFC-2 is actually a remaining of FFC – The National Consensus – which staged the famous sit-in around the Republican Palace on October 21, 2021, 5 days before the coup of 25th October 2021. This group and the new FFC-2 Democratic Bloc are the same people opposing FFC-1 and adamantly rejecting the Sudanese bar Association constitutional draft.
El-hassan El-Mirghani led a big group of DUP supporters and signed in the Bar Association draft.
Also the return El-Hassan was unexpected and took speedy steps to align with FFC-1. This led the old guards of the DUP with the support of the intelligence of an Arab country to consolidate their efforts to offset the nascent move of El-Hassan. The move which will bolster the FFC-1 negotiations with the military component.
The calculated an timely return of Mawlana impeded the ongoing talks between the military component and FFC-1 which is manifested by unexpected pessimistic rhetoric from all components of FFC-1 which openly called for escalating the streets rallies and demonstrations. The situation is back to square one.
What is actually happening since October 25th 2021 is a carefully calculated turbulence and continuous complication on the political scene of Sudan conducive to staying of military component on top of the ruling. The ultimate objection of the external coaching team is to have a stable Sudan under a hybrid governance of virtual civilian democratic rule closely controlled by a clandestine military body. The prime moves of the external coaches is a speedy exploitation of the vast resources of the country on the basis of mutual and shared benefits that transforms Sudan to a wealthy and stable country acceptable by the majority of the citizens.