The African Union.. Good intentions and bad preparation

What is behind news
Mohamed Wada

More than (60%) of the invitations to civil society, with political backgrounds

  • The dominance of the European Union in the meeting is one of the biggest threats to the meeting *
    Did the African Union discuss the possibility of lifting Sudan’s membership freeze, at least temporarily, during the dialogue period?
    Is it wise to invite the People’s Movement (Al-Hilu) after announcing that it stands by the rebel Rapid Support Forces?
    This elite was unable to solve the crisis before the war broke out, and its vision of the crisis did not change after the war.
    Under the title (the first phase of the preparatory meeting for political dialogue for peace and stability in the Republic of Sudan), the African Union distributed invitation cards to (64) parties and personalities representing some of the main actors in Sudan, including the Freedom and Change Group, the Central Council and the Democratic Bloc. And there is nothing wrong with allocating a single invitation (for the nation of nationalist and federal origin) who are represented in the two blocs, and invitations for groups outside the two blocs (the National Movement, the Popular Congress, the Communist Party, the Baath of origin, the People’s Movement – Al-Hilu, the Sudan Liberation Movement – Abdul Wahid), and Elected and unelected professionals, the call included (20) from civil society, (9) academics, (5) calls for peace parties despite their presence in the two blocs, (5) calls for initiative owners,
    The African Union identified the observers under the name of the mini-mechanism, and they are (the African Union, IGAD, the United Nations, the Arab League, the European Union, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States of America), and the invitation stated that The invited parties will determine the agenda, place, time, and membership to participate in the Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue. It is noted that more than (60%) of the calls are for the hidden civil society, and this is an indication of the dominance of the European Union’s point of view before the start of the meeting, and this is in addition to the sharp differences between These components, in addition to the deep differences among these parties, may be among the most important threats to this meeting.
    In the list of observers, the African Union and IGAD were mentioned as one party. This description may disturb the mission of the (mini) mechanism for observers, especially since the mini mechanism, in contrast to its name, consists of dozens of countries and organizations, and it is expected that the attendance of observers will be more than the invitees, and At the same time, the mission and mechanisms of the observers were not specified, and it is unfortunate that the resistance and youth committees were ignored. This approach was suitable for resolving the crisis before April 15th. Now the situation is different. There is a huge change in the description and identification of the main actors. This is the same elite that stood unable to solve it. The crisis before the outbreak of the war, and its vision of the crisis did not change after the war.
    The invitation was faced with strong indicators that weakened the chances of success of the meeting with apologies for not attending, (5) apologies in the first hours to be sent, information indicating that dozens of apologies are about to be announced, protesting the method of the invitation and the failure to consult the invitees, and this is a dishonorable method for inviting personalities on whom the African Union relies. In preparation for the Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue meeting, it is noted that the invitation may have brought together the African Union and IGAD on the grounds that they had an initiative that was rejected by the Sudanese government, the armed forces and many political forces, and it was an attempt to recreate the role of a decree of Kenyan President Ruto. The invitation also ignored the initiative Jeddah, and the initiative of Sudan’s neighboring countries, and according to what was published, the invitation did not include Eritrea, Central Africa, and Libya from Sudan’s neighbors.
    Since good preparation for the meeting is the gateway to the success of the dialogue, it is not known whether the army leadership or the Sudanese government were consulted? Or does the African Union assume that the results of the dialogue will be accepted in advance? Did the African Union discuss the possibility of lifting Sudan’s membership freeze, at least temporarily, during the dialogue period? And is it reasonable to discuss solutions in the absence of the representative of the party entrusted with adopting these solutions, assuming the success of the dialogue? Is it wise to invite the People’s Movement (Al-Hilu) after announcing its support for the rebel Rapid Support Forces at this time and after attacking the army in the Blue Nile C And c Kordofan? Did the African Union ask it to stop attacking the army?
    This is an opportunity that will not be repeated again, especially since the African Union conducted bilateral consultations with some parties and found initial acceptance, and accordingly it was expected that the preparation would be excellent, and that it would go beyond the folkloric approach in selecting the invitees.
    Our keenness on the role of the African Union requires us to advise it in terms of reviewing its method of issuing invitations, consulting with invitees, expanding the scope of the invitation to include actors who were not invited, and working to lift its decision to freeze Sudan’s membership. This is a bad start and an approach that will weaken the role of the African Union in resolving the crisis. in our country,
    August 24, 2023 AD
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