Will Sudan Disappear?
By Malik Mohamed Taha
Ukraine is not a party to the conflict, but it has become the battleground for two opposing sides. This theory solidifies daily, revealing one side led by Russia with its allies, and the other by the West, spearheaded by the U.S. and the EU.
Ukraine has become the object of contention, with Russia wanting it to remain loyal and the West viewing it as a tool to strike at Moscow. The initial approach by both sides was to install a loyal government in Kyiv.
No matter the outcome of the current war, Ukraine will never return to being solely for Ukrainians. It will be governed by the will of the victorious side, either through the installation of a fully loyal government or by maintaining a substantial military presence to safeguard the victory. Kyiv will not be able to make decisions without consulting the victor. In other words, even if Ukraine’s geography remains intact, its sovereignty will disappear.
Syria preceded Ukraine in this regard. What remains of “Syria the state” is currently under the protection of Russia and Iran, but Damascus has exited the equation as a cohesive, sovereign entity.
Iraq, too, has ceased to function as a state, as has Yemen. In both cases, the equation of statehood—comprising land, people, and a government that exercises sovereignty—has broken down. Territory has been lost at the edges, and there is no universally accepted government, or rather no central authority, due to the difficulty of establishing one. Forming a government in Yemen is impossible, and establishing one in Iraq is not easy; it requires looking east toward Tehran and north and west toward the U.S.
Libya is a prime example of a disappearing state. Like Ukraine, it is a battleground. It has two governments, each backed by international and regional players. One in the east has its allies with military presence on the ground, while the government in the west enjoys external military protection.
The lessons from these examples show that the gateway to control is through changing leadership. There is nothing to prevent such changes, even if the government is democratic, elected, and legitimate. What prevents change is internal strength and cohesion. Erdogan was nearly ousted despite being elected, while the elected leaders Morsi and Imran Khan were both removed, albeit by different means.
The takeaway from these three cases is that democracy alone does not provide protection if the major players decide to overthrow a government. It also shows that non-democratic regimes can receive international protection if they comply with the major powers.
Some Sudanese may prefer to view themselves as different from those undergoing such changes around them. This could be due to a lack of awareness or excessive self-confidence, but neither reason is a sufficient safeguard unless there is internal cohesion to prevent the loss of land or sovereignty.
Sudan is currently on the verge of losing its sovereignty, assuming, for argument’s sake, that its geography remains intact. The situation is nearing the point where Sudan could become merely a zone of regional and international influence, cloaked under the guise of “Yes to Sudanese freedom, no to a free Sudan.”
Proponents of civilian and democratic rule in Sudan, who revere the (fractured) international community and cling to it to achieve their goals, should raise their eyes slightly, but not beyond Lebanon. Lebanon is fully civilian, but it’s impossible to form a government there without the approval of at least three foreign capitals. Lebanon can go years without a government being formed.
Looking at Sudan objectively and without bias, since April 2019, the country has not had a fully structured government. Hamdok’s first and second governments lacked a legislative council (the third branch of government), a constitutional court, and the authority to appoint governors. They were heavily influenced by foreign powers in decision-making, from price liberalization to legal reforms, normalization, and paying compensation.
Then came Burhan’s decisions in October, which succeeded in one thing: putting the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) on equal footing with other political forces. However, these decisions also exposed the inability to reach a consensus on forming a government and revealed the extensive foreign presence and activity in shaping Sudan’s internal situation.
It is foreign powers that now outline the government in Sudan—its composition, who participates, who does not, how the constitution will be written, whether elections will be held, and when. Foreign actors control more than half the answers to these critical questions. And certainly, those who plant the seeds of a settlement will reap its outcomes.
Is Sudan’s current situation different from the examples of disappearing states? With the understanding that disappearance does not necessarily mean being swallowed by the sea, but rather moving from the role of actor to being acted upon.
October 26, 2022
