UK—Wielding the Pen, Bearing the Disappointment
By/Somia Sayed
The UK attempt to establish a contact group aimed at facilitating ceasefire talks in Sudan has collapsed. British Foreign Secretary David Lammy expressed regret over the failure to reach an agreement on a political roadmap.
The UK, France, Germany, and the African Union were unable to issue a joint communiqué from the London Conference, as deep and fundamental disagreements over the war in Sudan dominated the discussions.
According to The Guardian, divisions among Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates derailed the conference, preventing the issuance of a unified declaration.
Saudi Arabia categorically rejected any measures or actions taken outside the framework of Sudan’s official state institutions, insisting that such steps would violate the country’s unity and legitimacy. Deputy Foreign Minister Engineer Waleed Al-Khuraiji issued a strong warning against calls to form a parallel government or any alternative authority.
Egypt, long the clearest voice on the Sudan war, has taken an identical stance. It backs Sudan’s Armed Forces as the legitimate authority and firmly supports the country’s territorial integrity.
In contrast, the UAE—one of the most prominent players fueling the war through its support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—has adopted a diverging position. These clashing visions translated into opposing stances on how to approach Sudan’s crisis and what solutions to pursue at the London Conference.
Egypt sees the best political solution as one that preserves the role of the military institution and, like Saudi Arabia, advocates for a Sudanese-led resolution. Meanwhile, the UAE emphasizes solutions that safeguard its regional influence and economic interests—interests closely tied to the continued presence and power of the RSF within Sudan.
Saudi Arabia and Egypt are aligned in preferring a greater Arab role in the peace process, while the UAE pushes for broader international involvement, regional mediation, and its own role as a broker—an approach Sudan firmly rejects.
Beyond immediate concerns, the three countries also differ markedly in their visions for Sudan’s political system and postwar state structure.
The London Conference was, on paper, aimed at bolstering the coherence of the international response to Sudan’s crisis and focusing efforts on delivering humanitarian aid. Financial pledges were announced to support these goals. Yet when the outcomes are measured against the conference’s lofty rhetoric, it becomes clear that it was little more than empty posturing.
According to international aid agencies, Sudan’s 2025 humanitarian response plan requires $4.2 billion to provide lifesaving assistance to approximately 21 million vulnerable people inside the country—on top of $1.8 billion needed to support refugees in neighboring nations. UNICEF alone has appealed for $1 billion to address the urgent needs of children.
Despite the extensive media attention and international mobilization, the London Conference ended with pledges totaling just €800 million. Britain offered an additional £120 million, Germany pledged €125 million, and France €50 million.
In the end, the conference delivered more disappointment than substance—a pen held high, but with nothing meaningful written.
