The Red Sea and the Horn of Africa: The New Arena of Rivalry Amid the Iranian-American-Israeli Conflict
Analytical Report | March 2026
The Pivotal Event — The Addis Ababa Meeting (March 9–11, 2026)
In a striking diplomatic move, Ethiopia hosted the ambassadors of Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the Sultanate of Oman in Addis Ababa between the ninth and eleventh of March 2026. According to the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, discussions centered on strengthening bilateral relations, expanding economic cooperation, and exchanging views on regional developments.
This meeting was preceded by intensive diplomatic activity. Israeli President Isaac Herzog visited Addis Ababa on February 25, 2026, where he assured Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed that while certain parties were seeking to undermine Israeli relations across Africa, the shared bonds between them were “stronger than any attempt to cause division.”
The Strategic Dimension — The Contest Over Maritime Corridors
These developments fit within a deeper regional struggle for dominance over the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Since October 7, 2023, Iran-backed Houthi forces have launched missiles toward Israel and disrupted international commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, prompting Israel to broaden its engagement on the geopolitical stage of the Horn of Africa.
Somaliland’s geographic position tightens this equation considerably. Overlooking the Gulf of Aden coastline, Somaliland offers Israel the opportunity to establish military positions that would enhance its operational capabilities, as well as the ability to influence maritime trade flows and gain unimpeded access to the Horn of Africa.
Israel’s Recognition of Somaliland — A Geopolitical Earthquake
In a historic shift, Israel became on December 26, 2025, the first United Nations member state to formally recognize the independent Republic of Somaliland. Prime Minister Netanyahu framed the decision as one made “in the spirit of the Abraham Accords.”
Available indicators suggest that this recognition carries direct security implications. On January 13, 2026, Somaliland’s foreign minister declared that there are “no limits to the areas of cooperation” with Israel, in an apparent reference to ongoing discussions regarding the potential establishment of an Israeli military base.
The Atlantic Council, for its part, affirmed that the recognition elevates the relationship from informal coordination to institutionalized government-to-government cooperation, opening formal channels for security dialogue, an Israeli diplomatic presence, and collaboration on port security — all within the broader context of countering Houthi threats.
Ethiopia — The Pivot Everyone Wants
Ethiopia sits at the heart of this competition by virtue of its demographic weight and its ambitions to gain access to the sea. The Horn of Africa lies at the intersection of both the African and Middle Eastern security systems, borders the Red Sea, neighbors Yemen — the theater of Iranian-Gulf rivalry — and forms a vital maritime corridor linking Europe to the Gulf and Asia.
This reality has compelled Washington to recalibrate its approach. The opening of 2026 saw a notable intensification of American-Ethiopian contacts, with AFRICOM leadership praising Ethiopia’s contributions to regional security and reaffirming U.S. support for its counterterrorism efforts.
Washington’s backing of Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions is also reshaping the broader geopolitical landscape, positioning Addis Ababa as a pivotal anchor in a region where China and Russia are actively competing for influence.
Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, is playing its hand differently. Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan’s visit to Addis Ababa in February 2026 appeared designed to position Riyadh as a neutral mediator rather than an ideological partisan — part of a broader strategy of deepening diplomatic engagement with Ethiopia in order to counterbalance Emirati influence without committing to an unconditional alignment.
The Counter-Alliances — A Bloc Against Ethiopia and Israel
Against this backdrop, a regional counter-bloc has begun to take shape. In April 2025, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, during a visit to Djibouti, asserted that stewardship of the Red Sea must be restricted to its coastal states — a position that effectively excludes Ethiopia from any security arrangements in this critical waterway.
China’s opposition follows a different but equally firm logic. Beijing’s resistance to recognizing Somaliland is not solely about Africa; it is about the precedent being set in a maritime corridor central to its global strategy. China seeks to build an arc of influence stretching from the Horn of Africa all the way to the Suez Canal, and any disruption to that vision carries consequences far beyond the region.
Analytical Conclusion
Taken together, these developments reveal that the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea have become an arena in which Iranian, American, Israeli, Gulf, Chinese, and Turkish calculations are deeply intertwined. From the tragedy of war in Sudan to the security challenges in Somalia and Ethiopia’s drive to reach the sea, the region’s map is being redrawn in real time — under the weight of accumulated pressures where the dynamics of the Gulf crisis converge with the internal forces shaping the Horn of Africa from within.
Brownland/ ROGAIA ELJAILANI
