Tibesti, Chad: Gold Mine or Flashpoint?Exclusive Report for Brown Land

By Mohamed Saad Kamil

Northern Tibesti in Chad has, over the past decade, become the center of a multidimensional conflict: an immense mineral wealth that has not translated into development but instead produced a security, economic, and environmental crisis with local and regional repercussions. This report examines the roots of the problem, the local and regional actors involved — with particular emphasis on the role of global gold refining centers, especially the UAE — and proposes practical, actionable steps to limit the damage and turn the resource into a driver for development.
As of September 17, Kaka’s forces have reached the outskirts of Tibesti (50 kilometers from the province) and are awaiting orders to move — adding yet another chapter to the tragedy of the Chadian people.
How Did the Crisis Begin? A Swift Discovery and International Gaps
The discovery of large gold deposits in fields like Kouri Bougoudi in 2012 and afterward triggered a “rush” of artisanal miners and migrants seeking quick profits in a geographically harsh and remote area, far from effective government oversight. This rush was not accompanied by the creation of regulatory institutions or infrastructure to protect rights and organize the market. Mining quickly turned into an informal activity exploited by traders and middlemen.
Security and Humanitarian Dimensions: Human Losses and Armed Chaos
The “non-sovereign” environment in the north and the ease of cross-border movement of weapons and displaced people turned the gold mines into battlegrounds for violent clashes among miners, tribal groups, and even armed factions. Tragic incidents illustrate this shift: mine collapses killed dozens in 2019, and in May 2022, the government announced that clashes between miners had left around 100 people dead. These figures highlight the cost of chaos on civilians and the local economy.
Parallel Economy and Smuggling: The State as the Loser
Analysts note that most of the gold produced in Tibesti exits through informal channels — smuggling networks that stretch through Libya to regional and international markets — depriving the national treasury of vital tax revenues and fueling a parallel economy that operates without transparency or oversight. Broader analyses of African gold trafficking show that vast quantities pass through trade hubs in the Middle East before reaching global markets.
However, Chadian politician Aboubakar Rajab Dazi of the MDJT movement told Brown Land that the Chadian government itself is the primary beneficiary of mining operations nationwide, and that most gold revenues do not enter state coffers but rather benefit individuals and groups tied exclusively to President Mahamat Kaka.
Meanwhile, the Tibesti Self-Defense Committee stated that one of the key drivers of the conflict in the region is the government’s attempt to bring in mining companies and deprive citizens of their right to mine — including Somik, the largest mining company in the area, headed by General Mohamed Sharaf al-Din.
Cross-Border Networks and Local Actors
Being a border region, Tibesti has become the operating ground for smuggling gangs, armed factions, and cross-border intermediaries who organize supply chains from excavation to export routes. Logistical gateways in Libya and links to coastal markets have enabled the creation of complex criminal networks, making any purely local solution limited in effectiveness unless paired with regional cooperation and part of broader anti–money laundering and counterterrorism efforts.
Environmental and Social Impact: Poison Instead of Prosperity
Artisanal and small-scale mining in Tibesti is typically carried out with primitive techniques. The use of toxic materials such as mercury — and at times cyanide — in gold extraction pollutes water and soil, threatening the livelihoods of the few pastoralist and farming communities in the region. Additionally, the influx of laborers into the mining fields puts pressure on basic services and pulls young people away from education and formal employment. International organizations have documented this pattern across artisanal mining areas in the Sahel and recommended measures focused on regulating use and limiting toxic materials.
The UAE’s Role: Final Market and Demand Driver
The global gold market plays a central role in sustaining or curbing illegal mining activities. Investigative journalism and international reports have shown that large quantities of African gold are smuggled and directed toward major trade hubs in the Gulf, particularly Dubai. This flow has sparked international criticism of customs and monitoring systems in those ports, along with calls to tighten rules on gold sourcing and supply chain transparency. The aim is not to accuse any one country of pursuing a specific policy, but rather to point out that the presence of a willing and active market incentivizes smuggling and prolongs its life cycle — unless strict regulatory steps are taken at both the export and import levels.
Aboubakar Rajab Dazi further claims that the UAE has struck a deal with the Chadian government to seize control of mines in Tibesti, and that Kaka’s advancing forces are expected to face fierce resistance from the local Self-Defense Committee — an alliance of Chadian tribes residing in Tibesti whose primary livelihood is mining, though they are engaged in other occupations as well.
Why a Local Solution Alone Won’t Work
Even if N’Djamena (the Chadian capital) succeeds in boosting its security presence and organizing some mining sites, international demand and cross-border trade routes remain parallel drivers that reinforce the smuggling economy. In other words, without simultaneous measures by neighboring countries and global trade centers to cut off illicit trade routes, criminal networks will continue turning gold into quick profits.
Actionable Recommendations

1. Strengthen Sovereign Presence in an Organized Manner: Deploy specialized security units to protect civilians and regulate movement in mining areas — with strong human rights and transparency guarantees.
2. Formalize Small-Scale Mining: Issue conditional permits to artisanal miners, set up official purchasing centers subject to inspection and taxation, and introduce technological alternatives to reduce mercury use.
3. Implement Gold Traceability: Work with regional and international partners to establish a traceability system (mine → distributor → importer) that enforces sourcing standards before gold enters major markets — a process that will require diplomatic and regulatory pressure on gold trade hubs.
4. Combat Money Laundering: Tighten banking and customs transparency rules to prevent smuggling proceeds from being funneled through formal financial systems or trade routes.
5. Invest in Development Programs: Allocate part of formal mining revenues to improve education, healthcare, and infrastructure in northern Chad, reducing dependence on exploitative activities.
   Conclusion
   The mining problem in Tibesti reflects the intersection of local state fragility, international gold demand, and regional networks exploiting border gaps. If Chad seeks to turn Tibesti’s gold from a “source of unrest” into a true driver of development, it must combine domestic reforms focused on regulation and social justice with international coordination that cuts off smuggling routes and compels market centers to adopt higher transparency and accountability standards. This goal is achievable — but only with political will and tangible regional and international cooperation.