Sumoud Coalition… The Stage of Fission, Proliferation, and Amoebic Death

By : Nissren Alnimr
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Al-inwan 24 News Channel.
The world has established a strict ethical framework for democracy, one that tolerates neither circumvention nor falsification. These standards are a prerequisite for political existence, not mere rhetorical embellishment. Any practice that is not built upon these solid rules is nothing more than a hollow claim and false slogans manipulated by politicians who are often limited in intelligence and devoid of moral sense. This produces a flimsy, chaotic, and fragile scene, lacking the factors for sustainability and survival, and unable to last for a single moment once the light is shed on its corners.
Democracy, as a fixed human principle, inevitably requires the availability of public and individual freedom, moral responsibility, and equality in rights and duties. However, as Dr. Hayder Ibrahim states, “Sudanese democracy has almost been devoid of these required and desirable standards, and has been preoccupied with narrow partisan conflicts and the inability to confront real crises, which made its practice by politicians take a practical, pragmatic, and utilitarian path.” (Sudanese Democracy: Concept, History, Practice)
The Ethical Test
The current situation is strikingly similar to the recent past; Sudanese civilian forces, with their parties, fronts, and groups, are being tested anew, and most are failing their ethical examination spectacularly. Almost all of them have abandoned their declared values, reverted to the embrace of blatant pragmatism, and replaced the national compass with a compass of petty interests. These forces have become nothing more than truncated slogans, boldly raised without any moral legitimacy, in a desperate attempt to conceal the body of Sudanese political deception that has been exposed to the bone.
This applies to the so-called Coalition of Democratic Civilian Forces (Sumoud), which has now reached the final stages of “amoebic multiplication, fission, and death”—the stage where a single-celled organism divides, either to continue life or to perish. What is happening within “Taqaddum and Sumoud-Ta’sees” is nothing less than fission on the brink of annihilation: a state of political decay, confusion, and instability that can only be understood if returned to its full context and broken down to its putrid moral roots, until the moment of “popular and moral death” it lives today is reached.
The Critical Questions
To understand this tragedy, one must ask the burning questions:

• Who is “Taqaddum”?
• Why did it split and proliferate? And how did dirty political money—buying and selling—intervene to push it into two camps, solely to ensure its Emirati sponsor multiple negotiation cards?
• Why was Yassir Arman excluded? And why did Taha Othman Ishag, the master of money and decision, remain, unaccountable for his actions?
• Why did he stay in the other camp while his natural place, by any logic, is within the Ta’sees camp?
• What triggered the conflict between Hamdok, the representative of the “Emirati custodianship,” and the other group under the control of financial and political manipulation?
• Is mutual blame useful today after the hidden has been revealed and these forces have faced the wrath of the Sudanese people?
  Then comes the greatest question:
• What is the story of the three million dollars?
• What is the true, undeclared relationship between the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), Taqaddum, and Sumoud-Ta’sees on the one hand, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on the other?
• Does this relationship elevate to the level of transforming into a “political wing” for a militia involved in crimes against civilians?
  Finally:
• Does Dr. Abdalla Hamdok have the courage to offer a frank apology to the Sudanese people? Or will silence remain the official language of one who accepted to transform from a “symbol of a civilian phase” to an “instrument of killing civilians”?
  The October 25 Coup
  In the critical hours leading up to the October 25 coup, Sudan was living to the rhythm of a tense political moment. The state was standing on one leg on the brink of a deep abyss, where internal balances were rapidly collapsing, and the political scene was reeling under the weight of a struggle of wills, while external fingers were intertwined in the body of the state, to the extent that its sovereignty was threatened and its national decision was on the verge of confiscation.
  At the peak of this tension, and as the country approached the point of no return, the leadership of the Armed Forces and the RSF took what they described as “corrective measures,” based on security assessments raised to the highest alert levels. These assessments revealed, without ambiguity, an imminent collapse of the transitional governance system and dangerous fissures in the internal front, accompanied by an unprecedented external expansion that reached the point of directly influencing and threatening the state’s security and existence.
  Hamdok Agreed to the October 25 Coup
  In this charged atmosphere, a decisive meeting was held, including the military establishment leaders and Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, where it was agreed to dissolve the transitional government and announce a (National) statement—that is what it was called on the dawn of October 25. Hamdok expressed (conscious) understanding of the nature and gravity of the moment, only requesting a short delay to soften the positions of his partners in an anticipated evening meeting, according to documented evidence. It seemed at the time that this meeting would determine the fate of the entire phase.
  However, Hamdok’s meeting with his government’s leaders and his political incubator, the FFC, took another path. The attendees pushed him to cling to his position rejecting any understandings with the military component, asserting the inability of their military partners to undertake any adventure. Some provided assurances that they had received international guarantees that would abort any sudden move.
  Perhaps they were referring to the US Envoy, Jeffrey Feltman, who had left Khartoum only hours before the zero hour. Ironically, the man knew and was briefed on Plan A and B—but that is another story.
  Yet, Hamdok, who did not inform anyone of what he had agreed upon with the military (which I find rises to the description of treason), refrained from implementing the agreed-upon statement, leaving the arena open to a zero-sum equation that ended with the arrest of a number of civilian leaders and the declaration of a state of emergency. Thus, Sudan entered the phase of a full military coup, in a scene where the door to political settlement was completely and firmly shut.
  🇦🇪 Abu Dhabi: Flagrant Intervention
  With the acceleration of events, regional roles emerged clearly, foremost among them the United Arab Emirates, whose intervention preceded the coup phase. Through political and financial influence, the UAE contributed to re-engineering the structure of the FFC. We previously referred to the first meeting on April 12, 2023, which included Abdelrahim Dagalo, Mohammed Issa Aliou, Al-Waleed Madibou, and Saleh Issa, with one of the most important (secret) leaders of the Sudanese Professionals Association. These meetings then continued at RSF headquarters in Taif, all moving towards the necessity of joint work and coordination to manage the phase.
  The plan continued by working to exclude specific parties, such as the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party (Original), led by Ali Al-Reeh Al-Sanhouri, who justified his departure at the time by the alliance’s alignment with the coup leaders. This was preceded by the departure of the Communist Party from the scene. This did not happen by coincidence, as these arrangements were part of a comprehensive vision to reshape the Sudanese political stage, intersecting with regional and international interests.
  After October 25, with an Emirati green light, secret communications began between the RSF leadership and some FFC elements, including engineer Khalid Omer Youssef, Yassir Arman, and Siddiq Al-Sadiq, coordinated by Taha Othman Ishag, who later transformed into an advisor to Abdelrahim Dagalo. In the first meeting, Dagalo announced an apology for their participation in the coup, claiming it was merely an “Islamist” maneuver within the army, and promising to “correct the course” and work jointly against the military establishment. Joint work was agreed upon, on the condition that it be done remotely, by naming a coordinating mediator due to the sensitivity of the matter, and (Taha Ishag) was named as the coordinator. From here, the secret alliance plan began, with direct regional supervision and a comprehensive vision leading to a new alliance backed by a military force, working to besiege and dismantle the military establishment and return the “Political Quartet”—or what was popularly known then as (Four Long)—to power, or a swift coup that would rearrange authority in favor of this new alliance.
  The Alliance of War and Power
  The outbreak of war in April shattered those calculations. The swift coup turned into a defeat, as RSF forces collapsed in its first week, and the Armed Forces succeeded in absorbing the shock and reorganizing their ranks. With the RSF leadership losing control, they initiated the process of smuggling some civilian leaders via their SUVs, before groups of them were dispersed between Addis Ababa, Dubai, and Kampala, according to complete Emirati arrangements to formulate a new plan consistent with the field and simultaneously seek to beautify the image of the RSF after the widespread violations it committed in Sudanese cities.
  Abu Dhabi: Re-engineering and Marketing Hamdok
  In this stage, Abdalla Hamdok was summoned and re-engineered according to Abu Dhabi’s plan. The phrase here is deliberately precise, as he was offered tasks that intersected with his old image as the “man of the stage” and the “internationally accepted face,” and his new status as a high-ranking (Emirati) official, after his appointment to the Emirates Policy Center (EPC), headed by Ebtisam Al-Ketbi, who publicly spoke about the (legitimacy) of the UAE’s intervention in Sudan to protect its interests!
  This was preceded by funding for the African Centre for Development (ACD), whose board of directors is chaired by Abdalla Hamdok—this too is another story we will tell later.
  Confirmed information flowed in about him receiving 3 million dollars through the center, to build a new political project upon it, which was represented by the founding of the “Taqaddum” alliance. This alliance adopted a discourse harmonizing with the RSF’s vision and later signed the “Addis Ababa Declaration” with it—the most prominent political blunder in the new alliance’s journey (a document exists).
  However, the RSF’s crimes, especially after entering the cities, quickly exposed the limits of this alliance and emptied the discourse of “restoring civilian rule” of its moral and political content. This deepened the gap between these leaders and the Sudanese street, which witnessed the transformation of a segment of the revolution’s forces into an objective ally of a militia involved in crimes against civilians. It reached the point where one of the FFC leaders explicitly declared: “Yes, we allied with the RSF, and we can ally with the devil against the Islamist movement.” Although the Islamists’ page was turned by the people in the December revolution, using them as a pretext to justify alliances with external forces or separatist militias is a deception no less dangerous than the act itself.
  “Promediation” Buys Everyone for Abu Dhabi
  With the growing popular rejection of the Taqaddum alliance, the UAE, fearing the project’s collapse and the emergence of scenarios similar to the Libyan case, began an attempt to reshape it by dividing it into new components, most notably the Sumoud group, in a process of “divorce with grace.” This aims to distribute the civilian forces into two blocs: internal and external, with a third bloc representing the RSF’s political share. The next step was to re-market Hamdok as the leader of Sumoud, which African capitals have witnessed recently with the visit of Sheikh Shakhboot Al Nahyan, and the surprising talk by some leaders about Hamdok and his civilian alliance, without mentioning the militia leader Hemedti!
  The meetings in Pretoria, Addis, and Nyon are nothing but a step towards integrating some internal political forces supporting the army and the state’s legitimacy into this new path, most notably the Democratic Bloc. One of its leaders recently engaged in intensive meetings in Cairo with several parties from the Sumoud alliance and some envoys, where he spoke about the necessity of exerting maximum pressure on the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, to accept a settlement that begins with the Quartet’s truce and not to succumb to the (blackmail) of his other partners in the Bloc, as he called them. He did not stop there but went further in describing the internal scene as being controlled by Islamists, harmonizing with Abu Dhabi’s propaganda and misleading political campaign.
  Here came the role of the Promediation organization, which receives generous funding from Abu Dhabi and has documented links with the RSF militia. It organized several workshops in Port Sudan, Switzerland, and most recently in Malaysia, which included a number of Islamist forces. Perhaps they are unaware that Abu Dhabi’s veto has been issued to exclude all (Islamist currents), including the Popular Congress, from any upcoming negotiation dialogue table (Mr. Kamal Omar must know that their sale was blessed by their partners).
  The main goal is to impose a new political vision that divides the scene into 3 fundamental blocs (and no others will represent the Sudanese civilian forces) (The Interior Bloc, Sumoud, Ta’sees), and then work to gather them to present them in Switzerland as the “legitimate representatives” of the civilians, leading to the Cairo meeting under the title “Sudanese Civilian Forces 2,” followed by a special conference in Norway being prepared in complete secrecy.
  But this plan was shaken from within. Interests clashed between the Abu Dhabi group (Hamdok-Taha) and the Addis group, and the conflict escalated between Hamdok and Taha over control of the funding, before the final blow came from the partner itself: the Rapid Support Forces.
  In the Al-Fasher massacre, the moment of great fall, the crimes of ethnic cleansing there killed any possibility of granting the RSF political or moral cover. Al-Fasher has become the biggest dilemma for the international community, the point where manufactured narratives collapsed, and with them, Abu Dhabi’s projects and its endeavors to re-engineer Sudan through civilian and military proxies faded.
  Contact with Port Sudan (A Document Exists)
  With these facts exposed, some civilian forces sought channels to communicate with the army, and some secretly sent envoys to Port Sudan, while Yassir Arman left Taqaddum in a move that was not spontaneous (in a pragmatic political rapprochement that will be surprising to everyone). Others were threatened by the RSF with exposing secret funding documents, including a dangerous leaked document indicating large sums received by an influential figure in the Sudanese Congress Party without the party’s knowledge.
  Today, Abu Dhabi, through these forces, is trying to package its project with slogans of “No to War” and “Humanitarian Truce,” and has mobilized some of those who failed the patriotism test to adopt a broader current to undertake this task, hoping it will wipe away some of the blood that has stained its international reputation as the largest supporter of genocide and chaos in the modern era.
  Meanwhile, the Sumoud forces hide behind this cover, in a morbid desire to return to power under the umbrella of soft external custodianship, to place their interests above the blood of the homeland, and to replace the legitimacy of the people with the legitimacy of a militia or the influence of a fascist state seeking a foothold in Sudan. This is all happening under pressure and blackmail from everyone to everyone.
  The Escapes of the Civilian Elites
  Ultimately, what transpired was a resounding fall of masks that their owners thought were secure, only to collapse under the pressure of truth and the wrath of the people. The network of interests has been exposed, foreign custodianships have been laid bare, and the falsity of the slogans raised by forces that thought history could be bent by money or failed maneuvers has become apparent. However, Sudan, despite its wounds, is too great to be reduced to the deals of the fugitives, too pure to be sold in the markets of proxies, and too strong for its end to be written in hotel rooms or intelligence offices.
  This moment is not a moment for political analysis but a moment for historical differentiation: either a complete alignment with the homeland or a complete fall into the mud of treason. The people who faced bullets and toppled tyrants will not be defeated by an imported project, nor will they leave their destiny hostage to a handful of beneficiaries or a militia seeking cover.
  Only one truth remains:
  Sudan is writing the book of its future today, and only those who stood by it, not by its sponsor, will survive.
  In the final reckoning, only those who carried the homeland in their consciences will remain in the arena. As for those who sold it in the market of custodianship, their only share will be to fall to the bottom of history—a history that neither forgives nor forgets, and grants no opportunity for return or pardon to traitors.