Will the Port Sudan and Nairobi Governments SurviveTheir Devastating Internal Contradictions?

Professor Mekki El Shibly

Executive Director – Mamoun Behairy Center, Khartoum
📌 Internal contradictions within any political or military alliance constitute a fundamental weakness, often escalating into power struggles and deep divisions that hinder unified decision-making. Sudan, a nation engulfed in war, is witnessing such contradictions within the governments based in Port Sudan and Nairobi, raising doubts about their resilience and cohesion.
📌 The Port Sudan coalition government is plagued by a major internal contradiction, stemming from the instinctive tendency of its military and Islamist components to monopolize power, making an imminent clash likely. This was evident in the Islamists’ vehement reaction when Lieutenant General Al-Burhan criticized the National Congress Party last February. Moreover, emerging factions within the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), comprising intermediate leaders and junior officers dissatisfied with the SAF’s alliance with Islamists, could provoke further tensions. These factions may prefer expedited negotiations with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to end the war, whereas Islamists oppose such talks, fearing a settlement that does not guarantee them a prominent share of power and wealth. A clash between these groups could deepen Sudan’s isolation, prolonging the economic and political paralysis that has plagued the country for decades.
📌 The main contradictions within the Port Sudan Alliance are further exacerbated by its other components, which have temporarily aligned for personal gains. This includes the armed movements that signed the Juba Peace Agreement, which remained neutral in the SAF-RSF war for nearly a year, reflecting their self-interested stance. Despite their historical animosity toward the Islamists—who were responsible for mass atrocities during the Salvation Government era—these movements recently allied with the SAF to preserve their privileges through power-sharing. Some of these movements previously allied with the RSF under the Nairobi Alliance, showcasing their shifting allegiances.
📌 The Sudan Shield Forces also exemplify the self-interest-driven nature of the Port Sudan Alliance, as their allegiance oscillates between the SAF and RSF based on strategic advantage. This fluid loyalty foreshadows potential clashes if their interests diverge from those of other alliance members.
📌 Eastern Sudan’s political entities, which played a pivotal role in facilitating the October 2021 coup and restoring Islamists to power, are now disillusioned with their diminished influence. This frustration could prompt them to rebel against the alliance and withdraw their geographic support. Additionally, native administrations in eastern Sudan, which back the SAF for tribal reasons, may splinter over disagreements regarding the distribution of power and resources, further weakening the alliance.
📌 In response to escalating internal contradictions, the Port Sudan Alliance has attempted to leverage the Native Administration as a political and tribal tool to reinforce its fragile unity. However, even within this Native Administration, loyalties are divided among the SAF, armed movements, Islamists, Eastern Sudan entities, and the Sudan Shield Forces. Consequently, the polarization of the Native Administration has become a factor in inflaming the fundamental contradictions within the Port Sudan Alliance, rather than containing them.
📌 On the other hand, the Nairobi Alliance is equally burdened by deep-seated contradictions that threaten its cohesion and sustainability. The RSF, which serves as the backbone of the alliance, faces dual vulnerabilities: an unruly faction of military fighters and political infiltration by Islamists. The prolonged war has also produced ambitious field commanders seeking a greater share of power and wealth, potentially challenging the RSF’s dominant family-based leadership. Moreover, within the RSF’s tribal structure, fractures have emerged among the Rizeigat, Mahamid, Mahariya, and other groups, leading to fears that some officers may be sacrificed in future settlements to appease senior tribal leaders.
📌 Ideological contradictions between the RSF and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) (Hilu) are another significant fault line. While the SPLM-N embraces a secular and federalist vision, the RSF lacks a clear stance on these issues as it includes former Islamists, despite its anti-Islamist rhetoric. Militarily, the RSF seeks to expand its territorial control, whereas the SPLM-N prioritizes autonomy in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. These competing agendas could lead to an eventual confrontation between the two factions.
📌 The Nairobi Alliance also grapples with internal rifts within the National Umma Party and the Original Democratic Unionist Party. Both parties suffer from internal divisions, with some factions favouring an alliance with the SAF, while others reject collaboration with what they perceive as a militia responsible for grave human rights violations. Additionally, these parties’ religious affiliations hinder reconciliation with the SPLM-N due to its secular stance, further straining the alliance.
📌 The Revolutionary Front, comprising armed movements from Darfur and Blue Nile, also faces deep internal contradictions. Some factions distrust the RSF, fearing its dominance in Darfur, particularly given its past involvement in massacres against their communities. As a result, these factions are increasingly inclined to negotiate with the SAF instead, aiming to secure their influence and share of wealth.
📌 Similar contradictions extend to the Native Administration within the Nairobi Alliance. While some tribal leaders align with the SAF, others maintain strong ties to the RSF, which has resorted to financial inducements to secure their allegiance. Additionally, distrust persists between tribal leaders and armed movements within the alliance, as some fear an encroachment on their traditional power structures.
📌 The Sufi component of the Nairobi Alliance is also fraught with contradictions. Some Sufi sheikhs remain wary of the RSF’s historical connections with Islamists, raising concerns about its long-term direction. Furthermore, the RSF’s reliance on military force contrasts with the Sufi preference for dialogue and peaceful resolution, exacerbating ideological tensions. Additionally, many Sufi leaders fear that the SPLM-N’s secular agenda could provoke religious conflicts within the alliance.
📌 Even former members of the Sovereignty Council within the Nairobi Alliance face internal contradictions. Some members are committed to democratic civilian rule, while others align with the RSF and SPLM-N, both of which have taken undemocratic steps in adopting an illegitimate constitution and forming a controversial government. These divergent commitments threaten the alliance’s cohesion.
📌 Ultimately, the deep-rooted contradictions within both the Port Sudan and Nairobi alliances render their survival unlikely. The critical question is not whether they will collapse, but which will disintegrate first due to inevitable internal fragmentation. The only viable alternative to this impending disintegration is the establishment of a Third Alliance, one that derives its unity and resilience from the principles of the December Revolution, offering a genuine path toward a stable and democratic Sudan.

melshibly@hotmail.com