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A Mosquito’s Buzz in the Darfur Wilderness


By Dr. Osama Mohamed Abdelrahim
Friday, April 4, 2025

Like many others, I spent two days listening to various video recordings of the fugitive militia leader Abdelrahim Dagalo, following the defeat of his forces and their expulsion from their positions in Khartoum, prompting their retreat westward. While the very idea of paying attention to anything produced or uttered by someone like Abdelrahim—devoid of mercy—may seem absurd, it remains wise to understand the nature of evil in order to avoid it.

Unintentionally and unknowingly, Abdelrahim, now a disgraced fugitive, revealed a number of key truths, which we summarize as follows:

The current mobilization activities led by the militia leader in South Darfur clearly signal the collapse of his forces. These efforts represent a last-ditch attempt to rebuild military cohesion by recruiting and deploying new fighters, and politically, to impose a parallel authority with security services, police, judiciary, and other governance institutions.
The militia leadership is evidently struggling to maintain control over its members, as shown by threats to prosecute those who desert unless they return.
The group is facing severe logistical challenges, including shortages in vehicles, weapons, ammunition, food, and supplies. This was illustrated by Dagalo’s desperate calls for owners of four-wheel drives, double-cabin pickups, and Land Cruisers to contribute their vehicles for military transport and combat use. His threat to prosecute arms dealers further underscores the crisis.
The very fact that militia members are reportedly selling their own weapons and ammunition reveals an acute lack of financial support—salaries and benefits are likely unpaid. This not only compromises combat readiness but also indicates a loss of morale and focus.
Claims of graduating 20,000 fighters are an obvious exaggeration meant to boost morale among his followers and create psychological pressure on opponents. Visual evidence suggests the real number is likely below 5,000, and even that figure appears to be recycled from existing ranks rather than new recruits.
Internally, the militia is facing accusations of ethnic and regional favoritism. Abdelrahim attempted to deflect these by mentioning that his personal guard took part in the fighting in Nyala and will be deployed to frontlines.
His addresses effectively amounted to an implicit admission of defeat in Khartoum and central Sudan. His justifications, mostly hollow and unconvincing, were a futile attempt to rationalize failure.
The speeches lacked any coherent military or political objective. Instead, they were filled with contradictions and empty rhetoric. Ironically, when Dagalo cradled a child in full military gear while promising education and a better future for children, he undermined every value he claimed to uphold.
The militia’s greatest current fear is “smart warfare”—the use of drones, aerial strikes, and precision weapons. This fear was evident in Dagalo’s calls for face-to-face combat, an attempt to provoke traditional ground engagements.
Dagalo also tried to appeal to foreign backers by referencing terrorism and Islamists—clearly a plea to continue receiving support and sponsorship.
His declaration of a nationwide mobilization, claiming it to be a first, reflects the difficulty of continuing to import mercenaries—whether due to international pressure or a lack of funding. The high financial costs of such operations are pushing them to instead rely on domestic recruitment from their social strongholds.
Accusing members of the negotiating delegation of being “Islamists and remnants” (assuming that is even a valid accusation) is, in fact, a badge of honor—proof that these delegates are skilled national negotiators with no loyalty to any party but the country itself.
Dagalo blamed Sudan’s post-independence state for the people’s suffering, while conveniently ignoring the devastation his own militia inflicted in just two years—destruction that will take a century for history books to fully account for.
His frequent time-based directives—such as 72 hours, several hours, three months—reveal desperation to resolve the militia’s internal disarray and prevent its total collapse, fragmentation, or mutiny.
Targeting specific regions for war betrays the very narratives used to justify the conflict. This war is no longer about justice or marginalization—it’s rooted in racial hatred, deep-seated inferiority complexes, and a treacherous alliance with regional and international actors aiming to dismantle Sudan.
The shift from urban warfare, after defeats in Khartoum, Al-Jazira, and Blue Nile, to more traditional guerrilla fighting in valleys, rural areas, and mountains, marks a new and dangerous phase requiring different tactics and tools.
Dagalo’s recent admission that launching the war in Khartoum was a mistake—after two years of unprecedented destruction and human rights abuses—demonstrates reckless leadership and a moral void unfit for any role in guiding society.
When listing his allies, Dagalo referenced the “Awakening Council,” raising questions about the actual position of Musa Hilal and whether the group still operates under his leadership.
His repeated references to downing or neutralizing fighter jets and drones reveal the strategic priority his militia places on disabling Sudan’s air power—something the national military must urgently counter by enhancing aerial capabilities.
Turning to traditional leaders to spearhead recruitment through coercion or incentives indicates a rebuilding phase following massive losses in men, weapons, and equipment.
The threats and arbitrary directives that accompanied his speeches are an attempt to impose a distorted, illegitimate authority over parts of South Darfur.
Dagalo’s frequent use of street slang and crude expressions—like “Jockey” and “Muallim”—underscores the criminal, gangster-style leadership of his militia. Such forces must be confronted with strategic planning to neutralize their threat, as they serve no constructive purpose.
His speeches also exposed his limited capacity to engage diplomatically and his poor understanding of global and regional intelligence operations. His failure to keep confidences further reflects his unfitness for leadership.
Ultimately, professional armies are not led by chants and applause, and a nation worthy of respect cannot be governed through threats and intimidation. Real goals are not achieved by whining or wailing.
A virus invisible to the naked eye can kill a human being. A seemingly harmless microbe, once it enters the body, can multiply and wreak havoc. In the same vein, the content of Dagalo’s speeches—though they may seem like the buzzing of a mosquito in the vastness of Darfur—should not be dismissed. That buzz may not sicken you, but it could disturb your sleep. And if you’re not careful, it may leave you with malaria.

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